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COMMENTS
DEATHWITH DIGNITY FOR THE
SEEMINGLY UNDIGNIFIED: DENIAL OF
AID IN DYING IN PRISON
Kathleen S. Messinger*
The medical community has fundamentally changed how we think about
life and death. Humans in privileged parts of the world are living longer and
have access to life-saving treatment. The focus on quantity of life then has
shifted to emphasizing quality of life and questioning whether longevity
should at the expense of comfort or satisfaction. The conversation
surrounding quality of life, and by extension end-of-life care, has included
whether a competent adult has a right, or should have a right to end their
own life on their own terms. The history of aid in dying is wrought with
political ideology, notions of morality, and discussions of autonomy. In the
wake of an aging population, aid in dying is more relevant now than ever.
Aid in dying is often supported by notions of autonomy and dignity in
choosing the conditions of if, when, and how to end one’s life, however, there
is one noticeable segment of the population entirely left out: incarcerated
individuals. The incarcerated population is particularly relevant to the aid
in dying conversation because, as the justice system continues to balloon and
incarcerate more people, prisons are overcrowded, underfunded, and ill-
equipped to support terminally ill and aging inmates. This leaves the aging
incarcerated population vulnerable. As states continue to contemplate and
pass legislation that permits aid in dying in particular circumstances, one is
left wondering how, if at all, this legislation will affect those incarcerated.
* B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 2014; J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of
Law, 2019. I want to thank all of the members of the Journal of Criminal Law &Criminology,
specifically Natalie Unger, Nicole Steinberg, Emelia Carroll, and Andrew Page for their
thoughtful and diligent edits. Last, but certainly not least, I owe immense gratitude to my
partner, Jennifer Pesce, for her encouragement, support, editorial acumen, and unwavering
love throughout this process.
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Early signs, in the form of prison policies and regulations, of how prisons
will approach aid in dying for qualifying inmates suggests that the same
dignitary respect afforded to non-incarcerated folk is explicitly forbidden to
inmates in prison.
This Comment seeks to answer the question of who may choose to die
on their own terms, in their own way. If we find that incarcerated individuals
have a right to aid in dying, are there reasons or justifications for why we
should not permit it?
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INTRODUCTION
Few topics in American society illicit the strong reactions that suicide
and aid in dying do. For some, suicide arouses moral and religious
condemnation, and for others intellectual intrigue.1 Whatever the reaction or
interest, suicide is studied by a wide range of academic disciplines, and the
conversation has progressed from debating the morality of suicide to
debating the morality of the “right to die.” For the purposes of this Comment,
aid in dying refers to “a terminally ill competent patient’s decision to seek a
physician’s help in prescribing medication to hasten the dying process.”2 In
1 In Judaism, the Talmud prohibits suicide and for those who take their own life “whatever is
[normally] done out of respect for the dead should not be observed.” Jewish Virtual Library,
Issues in Jewish Ethics: Suicide, AMERICAN-ISRAELI COOP. ENTER.,
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/suicide-in-judaism [http://perma.cc/RXX7-Y6A9] (last visited
Feb. 17, 2019). In Christianity, suicide is neither expressly condemned nor encouraged, but
since the fifth century, St. Augustine claimed that suicide was a violation of the sixth
commandment, “Thou shall not kill.” Robin E. Gearing & Dana Lizardi, Religion and Suicide,
48 J. RELIG. HEALTH 332, 334 (2009). Further, the “view of suicide as sin dominates current
Christian attitudes across the dominations (e.g., Catholics, Baptists, and Protestants).” Id. In
Islam, the Qu’Ran expressly forbids suicide, which states “do not kill yourselves.” Al-Nisa’
4:29–30 (Alan Jones trans., E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust 2007). Different sects of Islam treat
suicide differently, for example for countries that have incorporated Sharia Law, suicide and
suicide attempts remain criminal offenses. Id. at 336 (internal citations omitted). Buddhism
by contrast is not as harsh as Christianity and Islam, but that is not to say that it permits suicide
because “a main Buddhist principle . . . is the principle of nonviolence, i.e. not killing or
harming living beings.” Robin E. Gearing & Dana Lizardi, Religion and Suicide: Buddhism,
Native American and African Religions, Atheism, and Agnosticism, 49 J. RELIG. HEALTH 377,
379 (2010). Thus, killing oneself is seen as a negative action that “results in another form of
suffering.” Id. Lastly, Hinduism treats suicide according to the sect and intention of the act.
Suicide in general is condemned in Hinduism, but if an individual practices prayopavesa, or
“fasting to death,” then it is an acceptable way to end one’s own life. Euthanasia and Suicide,
BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/hinduism/hinduethics/euthanasia.shtml
[[http://perma.cc/B4N7-8HZ6] (last updated Aug. 25, 2009). However, prapopavesa is
available in limited and certain circumstances. Id. Note that the aforementioned religions and
religious views of suicide are incomplete and do not cover all religions, but only the most
commonly practiced.
2 Yvonne Lindgren, From Rights to Dignity: Drawing Lessons from Aid in Dying and
Reproductive Rights, 16 UTAH L. REV. 779, 780 n.1 (2016). Many terms are used
interchangeably in the “right to die” movement including suicide, physician assisted suicide,
and euthanasia. While this interchange is understandable, the terms are not synonymous and
in fact are quite different from each other. “Suicide” is the “act of taking one’s own life.”
Suicide, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). “Aid in dying” is defined as the
“intentional act of providing a person with the medical means or the medical knowledge to
commit suicide.” Physician-Assisted Suicide, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014).
Lastly, “euthanasia” is the “act or practice of causing or hastening the death of a person who
suffers from an incurable or terminal disease or condition, especially a painful one, for reasons
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the past several years, a number of states have either passed or proposed laws
that permit aid in dying.3 While these debates continue, little attention has
been given to a prisoner’s access to aid in dying. This Comment weaves
together the historical and philosophical underpinnings of suicide and aid in
dying to assess how the Supreme Court and state courts have interpreted and
evaluated a constitutional right to die. In addition, this Comment will address
some of the most prevalent oppositional arguments to the availability,
constitutionality, and morality of aid in dying. In the end, this Comment
finds the denial of aid in dying in prison violates the Eighth Amendment of
the Constitution’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment.”4 This
Comment will proceed in four parts. Part I will undertake a philosophical
and religious historical account of suicide and how it has informed Western
ideals about suicide, which in turn have influenced the conversation
surrounding aid in dying. Part II offers a comparative analysis of how courts
have dealt with the issue of a patient’s right to withdraw medical support or
refuse potentially life-saving treatment as compared to a prisoner’s right
equivalent (or lack thereof). Part III provides an overview of how the
Supreme Court has weighed in on aid in dying and how it has conceptualized
various liberty interests in bodily integrity and autonomy, as well as the
Court’s jurisprudence on a prisoner’s right to health care and how this body
of case law has required states to provide prisoners with rights and access
that are not endowed on non-incarcerated individuals. Lastly, in Part IV I
argue that denying a terminally ill patient access to aid in dying violates the
Eighth Amendment based on the historical and philosophical underpinnings
of the “right to die” debate, the Supreme Court and various state courts’
treatment of health care decisions (both in the context of prison and outside
of it), and the evolution of the Supreme Court’s treatment of “cruel and
unusual” punishment.
of mercy.” Euthanasia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Within euthanasia there
is active euthanasia which occurs when “the physician takes direct action” to end a patient’s
life as opposed to passive euthanasia which “is simply withholding or withdrawing the
treatment needed to sustain life and allowing the patient to die.” DIXIE L. DENNIS, LIVING,
DYING, GRIEVING 40 (2008). Euthanasia differs from physician-assisted suicide because in
this scenario, the doctor “gives the patient the means to end his or her own life” and the patient
takes the action, which allows the patient to “decide not to go ahead with the act.” Id. at 43
(internal citation omitted). For a nuanced discussion of the evolution of the term “aid in dying”
from “physician-assisted suicide,” see Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratories of States: The
Progress of Glucksberg’s Invitation to States to Address End-of-Life Choice, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 1593, 1594–96 (2008); Kathryn L. Tucker & Fred B. Steel, Patient Choice at the End of
Life: Getting the Language Right, 28 J. LEGALMED. 305 (2007).
3 See infra Part III.A.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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I. PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUSHISTORY CONTRIBUTING TO THEAID IN
DYINGDEBATE
In many court cases, judges invoke the history and philosophy of suicide
to reject aid in dying.5 It is therefore necessary to not only situate the taking
of one’s own life within philosophical understandings of suicide, but also to
highlight general inaccuracies underlying the judiciary’s opinions about
suicide and aid in dying. While legal and moral philosophy have influenced
courts and society more generally, Western religions have helped form our
contemporary understanding of suicide. Many opponents of aid in dying,
currently and historically, have used philosophical and religious
understandings of suicide as persuasive authority to condemn suicide and aid
in dying and argue that it is immoral to take one’s own life.6 Opponents then
use their beliefs to argue that aid in dying should be illegal.7 Part I of this
Comment will provide a brief historical overview of the views of Greek and
Roman philosophers and critique how certain opponents of aid in dying have
characterized philosophical understandings.
A. GREEK AND ROMAN UNDERSTANDINGS OF SUICIDE
Some of the earliest prescriptive and descriptive philosophical opinions
of suicide come from ancient Greece.8 Elise P. Garrison, a scholar studying
the topic of suicide in Greek tragedy, argues that historical Greek attitudes
5 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–15 (1997) (presenting a
historical analysis of suicide and thereby assisting in suicide from our Nation’s founding);
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
that case law at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted “generally held that assisting
suicide was a criminal offense”); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 845–47
(9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Beezer, J., dissenting), rev’d by Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 793 (1997) (recounting the philosophy of Judeo-Christianity, Plato, Aristotle, Roman
law, St. Augustine, and Blackstone, among others, to argue against a constitutional right to
aid in dying); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 730–31 (Mich. 1994) (finding that there
was “no indication of widespread societal approval” of acts of suicide and “[t]o the contrary,
suicide was a criminal offense, with significant stigmatizing consequences.”). See generally
Woods v. Kentucky, 142 S.W.3d 24, 61–62 (Ky. 2004) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting)
(reviewing the Roman Church’s historical stance on suicide and euthanasia)).
6 See Part I.A–B.
7 Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 600, 620–31 (2000); see generally JENNIFERM. HECHT, STAY: A HISTORY OF SUICIDE
AND THE PHILOSOPHIESAGAINST IT, 45–62 (2013).
8 See MICHAEL CHOLBI, SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS 11 (2011). See
generally Suicide, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suicide/ (last
updated July 21, 2017) [http://perma.cc/M39V-LVA4].
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toward suicide stem from the concepts of shame and honor.9 These concepts
were of “profound significance” in ancient Greece and “motivate[d] many of
the suicides recorded by historians and nearly all suicides in Greek
tragedy.”10 For example, suicide could be a reasonable reaction to one’s own
performance in battle.11 Another example of honor and shame in suicide
arises in fifth century Greece where Messenian prisoners “refused to be tried
by their captors” and took their own lives instead.12 The Messenians died by
their own hands “in order to escape punishment and further disgrace.”13
Thus, it appears that in antiquity Greece, far from being universally
condemned or punished, suicide was permitted if shame or honor were at
stake.14 Garrison notes that “neither Thucydides15 nor Herodotus16 makes
any explicit value judgment concerning the suicide victims they mention.”17
The language they evoke, in part, explains the circumstances that led to
suicide and gives the impression that “suicide created no ‘moral revulsion,’
but rather provided people with an honorable release from an undesirable
life.”18
Opponents of aid in dying have suggested that historically, suicide was
forbidden. However, several counterexamples to this assumption exist. For
example, in The Right to Assisted Suicide, Justice Gorsuch argues that in





13 Id. at 14.
14 See id. Garrison cites another example of suicide committed to escape punishment. She
writes that the Queen of Babylon “flung herself into a room of ashes” after “taking revenge
on the Egyptians for killing her brother.” In Herodotus, Adrastus “stabbed himself from shame
at his bad luck.” Id.
15 Thucydides was a Greek historian born around 460 B.C. and is considered one of the
“greatest Greek historians.” Britannica Academic, Thucydides, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
http://academic.eb.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/levels/collegiate/article/Thucydides/
72310 (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) [perma.cc/FJ6S-VKH3]. He authored the History of the
Peloponnesian War, “which recounts the struggle between the Athens and Sparta in the fifth
century B.C. His work was the first recorded political and moral analysis of a nation’s war
policies.” Id.
16 Herodotus was a Greek writer born around 484 B.C.E. and is credited with authoring
the “first great narrative history” of the Greco-Persian Wars. In addition, he is considered the
“leading source of original information . . . for Greek history . . . between 550 and 479 B.C.E.
Britannica Academic, Herodotus, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://academic.eb.com.turing.
library.northwestern.edu/levels/collegiate/article/Herodotus/40200 (last visited Nov. 6, 2017)
[http://perma.cc/V37H-FCVW].
17 Garrison, supra note 9, at 14.
18 Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Compassion in Dying v. Washington,19 Judge Reinhardt misinterpreted how
suicide was treated in Ancient Greece.20 Gorsuch argues that Athenian law
“treated suicide” as a crime, “‘punishing’ the ‘guilty’ by amputating the
corpse’s right hand and denying traditional burial rituals.”21 However,
Gorsuch may have misinterpreted the practice. As Garrison contends, the
passage from a speech given by Aeschines in 330 B.C. “is the only reference
to such treatment of a suicide” and as such it is unclear “how regularly the
cutting off of a hand occurred.”22 Further, while Gorsuch argues that
Athenian Law treated suicide as a crime per se—indicated by severing the
deceased’s right hand—Garrison argues that evidence of antiquity Greece
suggests that there was “an uneasiness about suicides . . . [but] the evidence
does not suggest a categorical mistreatment of or societal revulsion from
suicides.”23 Opponents of aid in dying also point to what they perceive as
Plato and Aristotle’s condemnation of suicide, however, that too is a
simplified view of the kind of nuanced distinguishing factors that the
philosophers accounted for.24 In Phaedo, Plato opposes suicide because it
was “against the will of the gods and thus not allowed.”25 Despite his general
disapproval towards those who commit suicide, however, Papadimitriou et
al. interprets Plato’s text as demonstrating that Plato is “tolerant of people
who suffer insurmountable pain. He recognizes the right of the desperate
individual to commit suicide when faced with unavoidable misfortune due to
having led a less than good life. [He] takes into account the insuperable
unhappiness of such people.”26 Support for this proposition is found in
Gorgias and Laws; inGorgias Plato presents a scenario where those afflicted
with “incurable diseases” of body or mind may not be better off living27 and
in Laws he seems to carve out an exception to wrongful suicide where the
19 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Beezer, J. dissenting), rev’d sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1996).
20 See Gorsuch, supra note 7, at 623–27.
21 Id. at 623.
22 Garrison, supra note 9, at 9.
23 Id. at 12.
24 See Gorsuch, supra note 7, at 623–25.
25 John D. Papadimitriou, et al. Euthanasia and Suicide in Antiquity: Viewpoint of the
Dramatists and Philosophers, 100 J. ROYAL. SOC’YMED. 25, 26 (2007).
26 Id. See also PLATO, GORGIAS (E.M. Cope, trans., Deighton, Bell & Co. 1883) (~380
B.C.). The full text of Plato’s Gorgias is available at https://www2.southeastern.edu/
Academics/Faculty/jbell/gorgias.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VRB-MYQD].
27 PLATO, GORGIAS 109, line 512a (E.M. Cope, trans., Deighton, Bell & Co. 1883) (~380
B.C.). For a further interpretation, see David Levy, Socrates v. Callicles: Examination &
Ridicule in Plato’s Gorgias, 13 PLATO J. 27, 30 (2013); Daniel R. N. Lopes,Moral Psychology
in Plato’s Gorgias, 11 J. ANCIENT PHIL. 20, 37 (2017).
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person is “compelled by some terribly painful and inescapable bad
luck . . . .”28
Rather than openly condemning suicide, in Write to Death, Professor
Elizabeth A. Gailey, argues that Greeks had an “open tolerance” of
euthanasia.29 She grounds her argument on three principal reasons. The first
reason is the “fundamental trust in human reason.”30 That is, individuals
have the “right to make rational decisions about . . . their own deaths.”31 The
second reason is “[i]ndividual autonomy” or the notion that “man is the
master of his own body, with the right to decide his own fate.”32 Last, Gailey
points to the Greek “idealization of youth.”33 She argues that euthanasia was
considered a “viable means of achieving a ‘good death’34 [and was] an
appropriate option for individuals faced with debilitating or terminal illness
[or a] loss of dignity at life’s end.”35
B. HOW RELIGION HELPED SHAPE THE AID IN DYING DEBATE
While philosophical texts help frame the discussion on the morality of
suicide, as societies evolved, religion—particularly forms of Christianity—
began to play a greater role in setting and guiding moral standards.36 It is
28 PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO 268, lines 873c–d (Thomas L. Pangle, trans., Basic Press
1980) (~348 B.C.).
29 ELIZABETH ATWOOD GAILEY, WRITE TO DEATH: NEWS FRAMING OF THE RIGHT TO DIE
CONFLICT, FROMQUINLAN’SCOMA TOKEVORKIAN’SCONVICTION 25 (2003).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. (citing Thane J. Messinger, A Gentle and Easy Death: From Ancient Greece to
Beyond Cruzan: Toward a Reasoned Legal Response to the Societal Dilemma of Euthanasia,
71 DENV. L. REV. 175, 182 (1993)).
33 Id. at 26 (citing Nancy Osgood, Assisted Suicide and Older People: A Deadly
Combination, 10 ISSUES IN L. &MED. 415 (1995)).
34 ”Good death” literally translates to euthanasia. Euthanasia, MEDICINENET,
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=7365 (last visited on Nov. 6,
2017) [http://perma.cc/PA2V-KG6M]. “Eu” means “goodly or well” + “thanatos,” which
means death. Id. Thus “eu” + “thanatos” = good or well death. Id. Ian Dowbiggin notes that a
“good death” was considered by ancient Greek and Roman philosophers as “an appropriate
and rational response to a wide variety of circumstances. . . . Motives ran the gamut from
pains due to cancer, bladders stones, stomach disorders . . . the fear of dishonor and the hope
of avoiding judgment and execution.” IANDOWBIGGIN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA:
LIFE, DEATH, GOD, ANDMEDICINE 8 (2007).
35 Id.
36 See Suicide, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. at § 2.2, https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/suicide/#HigHisTho (last updated July 21, 2017) [http://perma.cc/KQ3E-T2PX]
(postulating about the advent of Christianity on the prohibition on suicide). Uncertainty exists
as to when exactly Roman and Greek societies began to transition from ancient views to
Christianity, but there is speculation that Constantine’s conversion to Christianity in or around
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believed that “Christianity [is] perhaps the most important event in the
philosophical history of suicide, for Christian doctrine has by and large held
that suicide is morally wrong, despite the absence of clear Scriptural
guidance.”37 As western societies moved away from ancient and classical
views on the morality of suicide, religion played and continues to play a
critical role in how we conceptualize life and death.
Religious sects overwhelmingly reject aid in dying.38 Opposition to aid
in dying stems predominately from ideas about a “natural” life: religious
leaders believe that aid in dying or hastening a natural death is contrary to
God’s intentions.39 The evolution of Judeo-Christian thought in society
explains the shift away from Greco-Roman beliefs about suicide and death.
As Judeo-Christianity established a strong-hold throughout Europe, beliefs
about suicide and a “good death” changed. Christianity in third century A.D.
emphasized the value of life, and unlike the Greco-Romans school of thought
that encouraged avoiding suffering,40 Christians viewed “suffering” as a
“consequence of—and reparation for—the wages of sin.”41 Without stating
the obvious, the very nature of Christianity centers on suffering, as
exemplified by the crucifixion of Christ.42 The culmination of Christian
thought on the issue of suffering is that it leads to “spiritual growth and
salvation.”43 One could see then how Christianity shaped ideas around pain
and suffering so that a painful death should not necessarily be ameliorated,
but rather in some ways celebrated. It should come as no surprise that the
Catholic Church “strongly opposes aid in dying” because “life should not be
prematurely shortened because it is a gift from God.”44 In addition, the
312 A.D. sparked a movement towards accepting Christianity, and over the next several
centuries Christianity gradually became entrenched. See generally Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe,
Christianity and the Roman Empire, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ancient/romans/
christianityromanempire_article_01.shtml, [http://perma.cc/KEY3-L68X] (last updated Feb.
17, 2017).
37 Id.
38 For a discussion on religious attitudes towards aid in dying, see supra note 1.
39 Christina L.H. Traina, Religious Perspectives on Assisted Suicide, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1147, 1148–49 (1998).
40 See, e.g., PLATO, GORGIAS line 480a–481b (E.M. Cope, trans., Deighton, Bell & Co.
1883) (~380 B.C.). See also Miriam Griffin, Philosophy, Cato, and Roman Suicide, 33
GREECE&ROME 64, 73 (1983) (death and pain are to be avoided) (citing SVF 1.190))).
41 GAILEY, supra note 29, at 28.
42 JUDITH PERKINS, THE SUFFERING SELF 13 (1995).
43 Id.
44 Religious Groups’ Views on End-of-Life Issues, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 3, (Nov. 21,
2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/11/21/religious-groups-views-on-end-of-life-issues/
[http://perma.cc/LPS2-SKGX].
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Mormon, Lutheran, and Episcopal churches also firmly oppose aid in dying
on similar grounds.45
C. RELIGION AND THE ORIGINATION OF THE PRISON SYSTEM
While it is clear that western religion opposes suicide, and by extension
aid in dying, there is reason to believe that these views may be strengthened
in the context of prison. This is because religion also influences how society
views the criminal justice system.46 In Do Moral Communities Play a Role
in Criminal Sentencing?, the authors argue that “religion and the criminal
justice system are often connected”47 because both the criminal justice
system and religion “revolve around the concepts of social control and
maintenance of normative community.”48 Thus, looking at how society has
formed in conjunction with religiosity provides a useful starting point for
analyzing how religion has shaped the aid in dying debate.
What this means for aid in dying in the prison context is that, in some
ways, to allow aid in dying in prison would be counter to and offend the
45 Lyman Kirkland, a spokesman for the Mormon Church stated that the Church “firmly
believe[s] in the sanctity of human life and its role in God’s plan.” Id. at 4. Reverend Roger
Willer, the director of theological ethics for the Lutheran Church opined “[l]ife is a gift from
God, to be received with thanksgiving, and there is an integrity of the life process that should
be respected.” Id. Lastly, Timothy Sedgwick, a professor of Christian ethics, acknowledged
that the Episcopal Church passed a resolution against aid in dying because “it is morally wrong
and unacceptable to take a human life in order to relieve the suffering caused by incurable
illness.” Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 AMITAI ETZIONI & DAVID CARNEY, REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 7
(1997). When we deal with crime and punishment, “we do not put it in the context of Christian
repentance, we do use language reminiscent of Christian teaching.” Id. at 38. For example,
“we place [offenders] in a ‘penitentiary’ and speak of ‘rehabilitation.’” Id. The use of
“penitentiary” then reflects society’s desire that prisoners “would repent, and would be able
to return to society . . . changed.” Id. Etzioni and Carney argue that there is then a religious
component to prisons, which is highlighted in the historical foundation of contemporary
prisons as well as the fact that prisons “usually have chaplains, and various ministries operate
within them.” Id. See Chai Woodham, Eastern State Penitentiary: A Prison With a Past,
SMITHSONIANMAG. (Sept. 30 2008), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/eastern-state-
penitentiary-a-prison-with-a-past-14274660 [http://perma.cc/9F6G-E537]. The relationship
between religion and criminal justice can be most readily seen in post-American Revolution
jail systems. Dr. Benjamin Rush, a Philadelphia physician with an interest in politics proposed
a new conception of American jails because he was “convinced that crime was a ‘moral
disease,’ and suggested a ‘house of repentance’ where prisoners could meditate on their
crimes, experience spiritual remorse and undergo rehabilitation. Id. The “house of repentance”
later became known as a “penitentiary.” Id. Repentance of course is a concept derived from
Judeo-Christian values.
47 Jeffrey T. Ulmer, Christopher Bader, & Martha Gault, Do Moral Communities Play a
Role in Criminal Sentencing? Evidence From Pennsylvania, 49 SOC. Q. 737, 738 (2008).
48 Id.
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central tenants of Christianity. Given the history of the relationship between
religiosity and the criminal justice system, it necessarily follows that the
interference in a prisoner’s suffering by a third party, in this case a medical
professional, is impermissible.
II. COURT TREATMENT OFWITHDRAWAL OFMEDICAL SUPPORT, REFUSING
MEDICALCARE, FORCE FEEDING ANDAID INDYING
The Supreme Court of the United States has never ruled on access to aid
in dying in prison. Given the absence of binding precedent, our discussion
on the constitutionality of aid in dying in prisons is informed by the way
courts have treated withdrawal of medical technology and do not resuscitate
orders, and how the Supreme Court has ruled on aid in dying. In addition to
the aforementioned topics, one particular issue of relevance is how courts
have treated hunger strikes and attempts at starvation in prison.
Prior to Washington v. Glucksberg,49 the landmark case resolving the
issue of aid in dying, both the Supreme Court and lower courts addressed a
patient’s right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.50 Cases prior to
Glucksberg largely grounded the right to determine end of life decisions on
the right to privacy and liberty interests protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clauses.51 However, as is often the case,
prisoners are treated differently than non-prisoners in terms of constitutional
rights because their constitutional right to liberty has already been removed
as a criminal punishment.52 When it comes to bodily integrity, right to
privacy, and liberty interests in refusing medical treatment, courts have been
more willing to infringe on these rights for prisoners.53 Additionally, there
are constitutional rights that prisoners have been granted—including the right
49 521 U.S. 702 (1996).
50 See infra Part II.A.
51 See infra Part II.B.
52 For an interesting discussion on courts treatment of a prisoner’s right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, see Peter Wood, Comment, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment:
Courts’ Disparate Treatment of Incarcerated Patients, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1167 (2008).
Wood argues that while courts have “generally held that a patient had a constitutionally
protected right to refuse unwanted treatment,” but that a patient’s “incarceration status”
changes the balancing analysis courts conduct in deciding whether the patient’s right asserted
outweighs the state’s interest. Id. at 1167–68. Whereas in these circumstances the “state
interests are normally held to be subordinate to a patient’s autonomy,” in the prison context,
courts have recognized the interest of correctional facility and thus when a prisoner wants to
refuse medical treatment, his right to do so is balanced against the state interest and the
interests of the correctional facility, which has “led numerous courts to deny prison inmates
the right to refuse medical treatment.” Id. at 1168 (internal citation omitted).
53 See infra Part II.B.
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to medical care—that non-prisoners have not.54 In sum, a prisoner’s bodily
liberty interests and medical rights differ from those of a free person.
A. OUTSIDE PRISON WALLS: WITHDRAWAL OF MEDICAL SUPPORT
AND PATIENT REJECTION OF CARE
“[S]ignificant advances in medical technology and its potential to
prolong life”55 shaped the debate about whether a patient has the right to
withdraw medical technology or prevent a doctor from performing life-
saving treatments.56 Despite the possibility of such life-saving technology,
some individuals “find themselves confronted with dire medical situations
where life may be extended but never truly bettered.”57 In other words,
longevity may be stretched, but the quality of the person’s life may be greatly
diminished. As the medical field advanced, the conversation evolved from
increasing life longevity to considering the quality of life lived.58 As medical
intervention became a real and probable circumstance in a patient’s life,
protections for patients’ autonomy and ability to retain control over their own
bodies became increasingly important. In 1977, Beauchamp and Childress
released the Principles of Biomedical Ethics, which emphasized the
importance of patient autonomy and has “been widely accepted as one of the
54 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See also infra Part IV.B.
55 1 MICHAEL S. GREEN & SCOTT L. STABLER, IDEAS AND MOVEMENTS THAT SHAPED
AMERICA: FROM THE BILL OFRIGHTS TO “OCCUPYWALL STREET” 864 (2015);
see also KANT PATEL & MARK E. RUSHEFSKY, HEALTH CARE POLICY IN AN AGE OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 61 (2002) (“The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a major
revolution in the field of biomedical technology that . . . increased capacity to prolong and
sustain the life of terminally ill patients indefinitely through medical intervention.”). But see
Margaret P. Battin et al., Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in Oregon and the Netherlands:
Evidence Concerning the Impact on Patients in “Vulnerable” Groups, 33 J. MED. ETHICS,
591, 597 (2007) (In a study conducted to evaluate the fear that aid in dying would
disproportionately affect vulnerable populations, the authors found “no evidence to justify
the . . . fear that legalized physician-assisted dying will target the vulnerable.”).
56 See PATEL & RUSHEFSKY, supra note 55, at 61 (detailing the relationship between
medical advances in the second half of the twentieth century, prolonged life, and concerns
about patients’ rights that placed “greater emphasis on patients’ rights to self-determination
and autonomy” which in turn “generated intense debate about . . . the right to die.”). See also
Andrew J. McCormick, Self-Determination, the Right to Die, and Culture: A Literature
Review, 56 SOC. WORK 119, 120 (2011) (detailing the history of the right-to-die movement
and highlighting how medical technology informed concepts of autonomy and self-
determination). See generally Thomas Bein & Daniel Brodie, Understanding Ethical
Decisions for Patients on Extracorporeal Life Support, 43 INTENSIVECAREMED. 1510 (2017)
(exploring ECMO and its implications for who should decide whether the patient should
continue use).
57 GREEN&STABLER, supra note 55.
58 See supra notes 55–56.
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four principles of medical ethics.”59 Indeed, the transformation of patient
autonomy led to a circumstance where “rights-bearing entered both the law
and the medical community through the creation for the requirement of
informed consent.”60
As the technology evolved, the relationship between doctor and patient
evolved as well. More than simply providing treatment as the doctor saw fit,
doctors began to incorporate and consider the patient’s desires in end-of-life
care. Simultaneously, perhaps as a matter of consequences, tensions
surrounding end-of-life care and the rights of the patient summoned courts
into the fray.
1. In Re Quinlan61
The debate about patient autonomy and the right to withdraw medically
necessary technology really galvanized the nation in 1975 when Karen Ann
Quinlan fell into a coma after consuming tranquilizers and alcohol.62
Because of her medical condition, she required a ventilator to breathe and
was being administered artificial nutrition.63 Five months after she fell into
the coma, her father asked the physicians to “withdraw care” and take her off
the ventilator.64 Despite offering to relieve the doctors of liability, the doctors
refused Joseph Quinlan’s request.65 Doctor Haider Warraich, a researcher
and physician at Duke University Medical Center, noted that the doctors
refusal was not necessarily surprising at the time because Quinlan’s case
arose when medical decisions were in a “complete ethical and legal
vacuum[,]” and doctors followed their own moral compasses.66
Joseph Quinlan brought suit in October 1975 to establish himself as
Karen’s guardian and assert Karen’s right to privacy.67 Justice Robert Muir
Jr. of the New Jersey Superior Court ruled on November 10, 1975 that Mr.
59 Lucija Murgic et al., Paternalism and Autonomy: Views of Patients and Providers in a
Transitional (Post-Communist) Country, 16 BMCMED. ETHICS 1, 1 (2015).
60 Nan D. Hunter, Rights Talk and Patient Subjectivity: The Role of Autonomy, Equality
and Participation Norms, 45WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1525, 1529 (2010).
61 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
62 Roberto D. McFadden, Karen Ann Quinlan, 31, Dies; Focus of ‘76 Right to Die Case,
N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/12/nyregion/karen-ann-
quinlan-31-dies-focus-of-76-right-to-die-case.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/93JA-
KNVL].




66 Id. at 74–75.
67 Id. at 76–78.
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Quinlan was not Karen’s guardian and left the decision to remove the
ventilator to the physicians.68 Justice Muir’s opinion reflected the judicial
sentiment at the time that medical decisions should be made by medical
professionals who are “exemplar of the ethical and moral standards of
society.”69 Mr. Quinlan subsequently appealed to the New Jersey Supreme
Court and in a unanimous decision, the Court held that the right to privacy
was “broad enough to encompass a patient’s decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances.”70 In addition to holding that Karen
Ann Quinlan maintained a privacy interest in the withdrawal of her treatment,
the Court also held that her father could serve as her guardian and assert
Karen’s right to privacy on her behalf.71 Doctor Warraich, inModern Death:
How Medicine Changed the End of Life, argues that the Quinlan case
represents three major points about the relationship between patient and
doctor: first, a patient has a right to withdraw life-saving treatment; second,
if the patient is not competent to make such a decision, the patient’s guardian
may make it on her behalf; and third, physicians will not be held criminally
liable for adhering to such requests.72
The Quinlan case is largely regarded as the first73 major step in the
“right to die movement” because it established and clarified the rights of
patients in determining their care. The case rose to national prominence,
garnering attention from medical professionals, religious leaders, legal
scholars, and the public at large.74 This notoriety is evidenced by the fact
that in 1977, merely two years after Karen had been admitted to the hospital,
50% of Americans supported some form of legalized euthanasia, and that
number increased to 75% in the late 1990s.75 Perhaps exposure to forms of
68 Id. at 77–78.
69 Id. at 78.
70 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
71 Id. at 664.
72 WARRAICH, supra note 63, at 84.
73 While Karen Ann Quinlan’s case rose to national prominence, the first legal case
involving assisted suicide took place in 1816 in Massachusetts where a prisoner was tried for
murder for persuading a fellow inmate to kill himself in order to avoid execution. GAILEY,
supra note 29, at 51–52. Though Massachusetts’ law equated encouraging suicide with
murder, the jury acquitted the accused prisoner. Id. at 51 (internal citation omitted). This raises
an intriguing question about the culpability of assisted suicide in the eyes of the public.
74 WARRAICH, supra note 63, at 81.
75 GAILEY, supra note 29, at 51. Note, as set forth in note 2, terms for aid in dying are
sometimes used interchangeably, and as such, the wording of public opinion polls may impact
results. See generally Morten Magelssen et al., Attitudes Towards Assisted Dying are
Influenced by Question Wording and Order: A Survey Experiment, 17 BMC MED. ETHICS
(Dec. 2015) (studying the effects of question wording and order on attitudes towards assisted
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aid in dying and euthanasia not only desensitized a very polarizing topic in
the eyes of public, but also established the role of the courts in determining
where the line must be drawn in terms of patient autonomy and self-
determination.76
While Quinlan was the first reported end-of-life case,77 the Supreme
Court subsequently ruled in a series of cases dealing with the
constitutionality of withdrawing and refusing life-saving medical treatment.
2. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health78
In Cruzan v. Director, the guardians of a patient in a persistent
vegetative state brought suit seeking to terminate artificial hydration and
nutrition for the patient.79 The Court confronted the issue of whether
Missouri’s requirement for clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent
patient’s wish to withdraw life-sustaining treatment was unconstitutional,80
and whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required
the state to accept the substituted judgment of a close family member in the
absence of substantial proof that their views match the patient’s.81 The Court
first confirmed that the Due Process Clause ensures that a “competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment.”82 Whether a person has a liberty interest is but the first step in
the constitutional analysis.83 The next step is balancing the liberty interest
against the state’s interest.84 The patient’s guardians in the case argued that
the Court’s treatment of a competent patient should extend to an incompetent
dying). The use of the statistic here is merely to show an upward trend in support for
terminating one’s own life.
76 For an example highlighting a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, see Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1136–46 (1986). The court in Bouvia held that medical
staff who, fearing that Bouvia’s expression that she wanted to die and would intentionally
starve herself, inserted a feeding tube against the patient’s will and against her express written
instructions violated her personal dignity and thus ordered the hospital staff to remove the
feeding tube. Note that the Superior Court found that the trial court erred in considering
Bouvia’s motive for failing to eat, namely that she expressed a desire to die, and certain
decisions that hasten death are permitted because the quality of life is diminished. Id. at 1142,
1145.
77 ALANMEISEL&KATHY L. CERMINARA, 3 THERIGHT TODIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE
DECISIONMAKING § 2.01 (3d ed. 2004).
78 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
79 Id. at 267.
80 Id. at 284.
81 Id. at 286.
82 Id. at 278 (citing and reviewing cases).
83 Id. at 279.
84 Id.
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patient.85 The Court disagreed with this contention stating that because of
the interest at stake, it could adopt a clear and convincing standard.86 To the
second issue regarding whether the state is required to accept the family’s
substitute judgment, the Court ruled in the negative. The Court reasoned that
there was “no automatic assurance that the view of close family members
w[ould] necessarily be the same as the patient’s would have had she been
confronted with the situation while competent.”87 Thus the State is permitted
to require a clear and convincing standard of evidence of the patient’s wishes
rather than defer to family members.88
B. COURT TREATMENT OF A PRISONER’S RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL
TREATMENT
While jurisprudence generally finds that a patient has a constitutional
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, the line of cases inferring such a
right has dealt with those who are “free.” What then have courts said about
a prisoner’s right to refuse unwanted medical treatment?89 Courts are
generally split on this topic, some courts state a prisoner’s liberty interest in
privacy and bodily integrity is paramount, while others allow prison officials
to force medical treatment even though the court finds a liberty interest
present.90
1. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers91
Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers is one of the seminal cases
addressing whether an incarcerated individual has a right to refuse unwanted,
albeit life-saving, medical treatment. While incarcerated at a Massachusetts
correctional facility, Mr. Myers developed a kidney condition that required
hemodialysis.92 The combination of failing to receive dialysis and refusing
85 Id. at 280.
86 Id. at 282.
87 Id. at 286.
88 Id. at 286–87.
89 See Wood, supra note 52; see also Mara Silver, Note, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners and
the Constitutional Question of Self-Starvation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 631 (2005); Daniel H.
Mendelson, The Right to Refuse: Should Inmates be Allowed to Discontinue Treatment for
Noncommunicable Medical Conditions, 71 MD. L. REV. 295 (2011); Marc D. Ginsberg,
Comment, A New Perspective in Prisoners’ Rights: The Right to Refuse Treatment and
Rehabilitation, 10 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 173 (1976).
90 See infra II.B.
91 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979).
92 Id. at 453. Hemodialysis is a procedure whereby blood is pumped out of the body,
cleansed of its toxins, and then returned to the body in addition to being prescribed medication
that would lower the defendant’s blood potassium level. Id.
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to consume a particular medication would result in his death.93 It would be
accurate to categorize the dialysis and medication as life-saving treatment.
After a year of receiving dialysis, Mr. Myers refused to adhere to his
regularly scheduled treatment.94 In 1979, the Commissioner of Correction
brought suit in the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, for a
declaratory judgment enabling him to compel Mr. Myers to undergo
treatment.95 The Court in Myers specifically acknowledged the motive for
Myers’ refusal to undergo treatment stating that it was not for his disease, the
effects of the dialysis treatment, religious objections, or a general desire to
die, but rather as a form of protest against being placed in a medium as
opposed to minimum security prison.96
The superior court in evaluating the claim considered that Mr. Myers
was young, the dialysis procedure was relatively painless, he was a potential
candidate for a kidney transplant, and that Mr. Myers would otherwise be
able to live a normal life.97 The superior court acknowledged that precedent
revealed that a person has a strong interest in being free from nonconsensual
invasion of his bodily integrity and has a constitutional right of privacy that
can be asserted to prevent unwanted medical treatment.98 Despite this, the
Court found that the prison’s interest in “upholding orderly prison
administration” outweighed Mr. Myers constitutional right.99 Indeed the
Court explicitly acknowledged that while “incarceration d[id] not per se
divest him of his right to privacy and interest in bodily integrity, it d[id]
impose limitations on those constitutional rights in terms of the State interests
unique to the prison context.”100 Taken together, theMyers Court upheld the
appeals court’s decision that authorized prison officials to use “reasonable
force” to restrain Mr. Myers during dialysis and other life-saving
treatment.101 TheMyers decision represents one of the many court cases that
93 Id. at 454.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 453.
96 Id. at 454.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 455–56.
99 Id. at 457. The Commissioner contended that the prison had an interest in preserving
the prison’s internal order and discipline and maintaining institutional security. Id. Further, he
argued that “the maintenance of proper discipline and supervision of inmates “mandate[d] an
authority to administer life-saving medical treatment without consent” and the prison’s failure
to prevent the prisoner defendant’s death would pose a “serious threat” to prison order by
possibly triggering an “explosive” reaction among other inmates and encouraging other
inmates to attempt similar forms of coercion in order to “attain illegitimate ends.” Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 453, 457–58.
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have allowed prison officials to intervene when a prisoner is refusingmedical
treatment.102
2. Washington v. Harper103
Prior to the 1990 decision in Washington v. Harper, state courts had
relatively unbridled freedom to determine whether and when a patient in
prison could be forced to undergo medical treatment against his will. The
Harper Court provided some semblance of an analytical approach to how
courts should decide “right to refuse” cases in prison. Mr. Walker Harper,
was incarcerated at the Washington State Penitentiary in 1981.104 He was
housed in a special correctional institute that diagnosed and treated prisoners
with serious mental health illnesses, where he was diagnosed with manic-
depressive disorder.105 After initially agreeing to treatment, he refused to
continue taking the antipsychotic medications he was prescribed.106 Upon
refusal, the treating physician sought to medicate Mr. Harper over his
objections.107 In 1985, Mr. Harper brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
failing to provide a hearing before prison officials administered his drugs
without his consent, in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.108 The U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that Harper had a “significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process
Clause.”109 However, the Court disagreed with Harper’s assertion that his
freedom to refuse medication, protected by the Due Process Clause, could
102 See Stephen Smith, Clarence Allen, 76, Executed, ABC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2006),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/clarence-allen-76-executed [https://perma.cc/8ZQJ-MNE3 ]
(Clarence Allen was sentenced to death in California, in September of 2005 he suffered a heart
attack in which prison officials revived him). Although Allen requested that the prison
officials not resuscitate him if he went into cardiac arrest prior to his execution, prison officials
denied his request and suggested that they would in fact resuscitate despite his request. See
Meredith Martin Rountree, Criminals Get All The Rights: The Sociolegal Construction of
Different Rights to Die, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 149, 188–89 (2015). See also Polk
Cty. Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk Cty., 594 N.W.2d 421, 431 (Iowa 1999) (holding that
the pretrial detainee’s interest in refusing medical treatment was outweighed by State’s
interests in preserving life and maintaining prison security); Langton v. Comm’r of Corr., 614
N.E.2d 1002, 1006 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that prisoners had no constitutional right
to refuse a mandatory tuberculosis test).
103 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
104 Id. at 214.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 214–15.
108 Id. at 217.
109 Id. at 221–22.
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not be overridden by the prison officials because “[t]he extent of a prisoner’s
right under the Clause to avoid unwanted [medical treatment] must be
defined in the context of the inmate’s confinement.”110 The Court then turned
to its precedent in Turner v. Safley,111 which established the standard of
review for constitutional claims brought by prisoners.112 Under Turner, the
Court reasoned the Due Process Clause permits prison officials to “treat a
prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs
against his will.”113
The case law demonstrates that while non-incarcerated individuals are
granted rights to refuse medical treatment on the basis of bodily integrity,
privacy, and autonomy, represented in cases like In re Quinlan and Cruzan,
the same liberties—although recognized by the Supreme Court in Harper—
are not afforded to incarcerated individuals.114 A prisoner’s constitutional
liberties are more readily affronted.115
C. FORCE FEEDING
An incarcerated individual’s inability to per se refuse medical treatment
highlights one scenario where courts treat prisoners’ autonomy different than
non-incarcerated individuals. The ability of prison officials to force feed
inmates is another example of how courts treat incarcerated and non-
incarcerated individuals’ autonomy differently. Based on the holding in
Cruzan—that a competent person has a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
110 Id. at 222.
111 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Turner established that “when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it reasonably relates to legitimate
penological interests.” Id. at 89. The reasonability of a prison regulation is governed by several
factors. The first is, there must be a “valid, rational connection” between the regulation and
the purported legitimate interest. The second is whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that are an avenue by which the prisoner can exercise his asserted right.
The third factor is, the impact that the accommodation will have on the prison community and
institutional resources. The last factor is “the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison regulation. Id. at 89–90.
112 Harper, 494 U.S. at 223–24.
113 Id. at 227.
114 But see Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
115 SeeWood, supra note 52, at 1176–77 (arguing that courts rationale of preserving order
and security as a legitimate interest are hypocritical because while the courts recognize a
liberty interest in being free from unwanted medical treatment, which can be overridden by
state interests, courts have recognized a right to privacy as to HIV-positive status, which
despite the potential for spreading the disease, courts have held that the disclosure of an
inmate’s status would violate the inmate’s right to privacy because “the disclosure was not
reasonably related to any legitimate [penological] interest.” (citing Powell v. Schriver, 175
F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999); Hilaire v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 934 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1991))).
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interest in withdrawing medical care—prisoners should be able to starve
themselves under the Fourteenth Amendment and autonomy principles.116
While the Supreme Court has not weighed in on a constitutional right to
starve, several state court cases are informative on the issue.
In Zant v. Prevatte,117Mr. Prevatte stopped eating on October 29, 1981
as a form of protest.118 Prison doctors monitored his condition until
November 21, 1981 at which point Mr. Prevatte refused to allow the medical
staff at the prison to continue to monitor him.119 The doctors estimated that
based on his physical condition, Mr. Prevatte would be dead within three
weeks if he did not receive nutrition.120 The State believed it should be able
to force feed the prisoner to prevent his death because the state has an interest
in the preservation of life.121 The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed and
held that the prisoner did not lose his right to privacy and therefore the State
could not override his decision to starve, even though it would likely save his
life.122
Despite the reasoning and ruling in Zant, other courts have failed to
recognize a protected liberty interest in the right to starve.123 For example,
In re Caulk sought to answer the question of whether a competent New
Hampshire prisoner had a constitutional right to die without State
interference and whether the prisoner “knowingly and voluntarily decided to
die by starvation.”124 The New Hampshire Supreme Court ultimately held
that the state’s interest in maintaining the criminal justice system and
preserving the prisoner’s life overrode the prisoner’s right to privacy.125
The aforementioned jurisprudence regarding the right to refuse medical
treatment in the prison and non-prison contexts and a prisoner’s right to
116 See generally Silver, supra note 89, at 632, 661 (arguing that “force-feeding a
competent inmate necessarily violates that inmate’s fundamental privacy rights” and the right
to starve “should not be affected by a prisoner’s incarcerated status. It should not be contingent
on a prisoner’s physical state. And it should not be conditioned on the purpose of a hunger
strike.”).
117 286 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 1982).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 716.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 717; see also Stouffer v. Reid, 993 A.2d 104 (Md. 2010); Thor v. Superior Court,
855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
123 See Silver, supra note 89, at 632 (showing that there are nearly fifteen state and federal
courts that have found force-feeding inmates is permissible in certain circumstances). See also
Comm’r of Corr. V. Coleman, 38 A.3d 84 (Conn. 2012); McNabb v. Dep’t of Corr., 180 P.3d
1257 (Wash. 2008) (en banc).
124 480 A.2d 93, 94 (N.H. 1984).
125 See id. at 97.
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starve show that while autonomy and dignity decisions are protected for those
who are not incarcerated, for prisoners, their rights are subject to the whims
of prison officials.
III. AID INDYING
A. OUTSIDE OF PRISON
In 1997, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of aid in
dying in two cases: Washington v. Glucksberg126 and Vacco v. Quill.127 In
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court held that a Washington statute banning
assisted suicide did not violate the due process rights of terminally ill
patients.128 However, the Court still permitted states to experiment and pass
legislation that permitted aid in dying.129 The Glucksberg Court
distinguished its holding in Cruzan by highlighting the difference between
“refusing” medical care, in which the patient dies from the underlying
disease, and aid in dying, where the patient dies from the ingested
medication.130 In the same year, the Supreme Court held in Vacco v. Quill
that New York’s prohibition on aid in dying did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.131 Thus, the Supreme Court recognized in 1997 that aid
in dying is not a constitutional right covered by the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.132
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Glucksberg and Quill,
many believed that the decisions effectively closed the door on the
constitutionality of aid in dying.133 However, though Glucksberg and Quill
upheld the rights of states to ban aid in dying by legislative initiative, the
Court did not reach the question of whether the practice of aid in dying itself
is unconstitutional. The significance of the Court’s decision not to reach the
constitutionality of aid in dying per se meant that states could decide to
legalize the practice. Because the Court in Glucksberg and Quill left open
126 521 U.S. 702 (1996).
127 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
128 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 723–25 (relying on Quill, 521 U.S. at 800–08).
131 Quill, 521 U.S. 793.
132 For a criticism of the two cases, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg
Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1501, 1503 (2008). He argued that the Supreme
Court failed to recognize that the Washington statute prohibiting aid in dying infringed on a
fundamental right to privacy and thus only applied a rational basis review rather than the
appropriate strict scrutiny review. Id.
133 See John B. Mitchell, My Father, John Locke, and Assisted Suicide: The Real
Constitutional Right, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 45, 47–48 n.14 (2006).
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the door to aid in dying, many proponents of aid in dying began to take their
cause to the grassroots level and push for legislation that would legalize the
practice.134
After the Glucksberg and Quill rulings, some states began to pass
legislation permitting aid in dying. Many of these statutes were a culmination
of evolving beliefs about autonomy, self-determination, and dignity.135 To
date, seven states and the District of Columbia permit aid in dying.136
Oregon, Washington, and Colorado permit the practice via public
initiative.137 California, Vermont, and Hawaii permit aid in dying by
legislative action.138 Montana permits the practice via court ruling.139 Lastly,
the District of Columbia permits the practice by city council vote.140 In
addition to the aforementioned states, several states have recently or are
currently considering legislation to legalize aid in dying.141
134 See Lindgren supra note 2, at 791–92, 97; Chronology of Assisted Dying in the U.S.,
DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/assisted-dying-chronology/ (last
visited Mar. 22, 2018) [http://perma.cc/6A2G-URXC].
135 See supra Part II.
136 CNN Library, Physician-Assisted Suicide Fast Facts, CNN (Jan. 3, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/26/us/physician-assisted-suicide-fast-facts/index.html
[http://perma.cc/TT6P-BMC3].
137 Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 126.800–.897 (2016); The
Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245 (West) (2009); Colorado
End of Life Options Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-48-101-25-48-123 (West) (2016).
138 California End of Life Option Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443-443.22
(West) (2016); Vermont Patient Choice at the End of Life Act, VT. STAT. ANN. Title 1-5293
(West) (2013); Hawaii Our Care, Our Choice Act, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-2 (West
2019).
139 In 2009, the Montana Supreme Court declined to decide an aid in dying case on
constitutional grounds and focused on a consent defense to a homicide charge under Montana
criminal law. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1214–15 (Mont. 2009). The Court found that the
Montana Terminally Ill Act shielded physicians from liability if they acted in accordance with
a patient’s end-of-life decision. Id. at 1222. Furthermore, the Court found that physician aid
in dying does not violate public policy. Id. Similarly, in 2014, a New Mexico District Court
found that a New Mexico statute that criminalized “assisting suicide” violated the New
Mexico Constitution because “the liberty, safety and happiness interest of a competent,
terminally ill patient to choose aid in dying is a fundamental right under [the] New Mexico
Constitution.” Morris v. Brandenberg, 2014 WL 10672986 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Jan. 13 2014),
rev’d, Morris v. Brandenburg, 356 P.3d 564, 567 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015). The New Mexico
Supreme Court upheld the Appeals Court reversal because the Court did not “recognize a
fundamental or important right to physician-assisted suicide” and New Mexico had a rational
basis for criminalizing aid in dying. Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836, 855 (N.M. 2016).
140 District of Columbia Death with Dignity Act of 2016, D.C. Law 21-182 (West) (2017).
141 In January 2017, a House representative from Connecticut introduced H.B. 6024, An
Act Concerning Aid in Dying for Terminally Ill Patients; in February 2017, an Iowa Senator
introduced S.B. 2015, A Bill for an Act Creating the Iowa End-of-Life Options Act; in March
2017, a House representative from Alaska introduced H.B. 54, Voluntary Termination of Life;
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States that permit aid in dying impose strict regulations on the
accessibility and availability of aid in dying. Some of the restrictions include
being a resident of the state or territory where aid in dying is legal, being
above the age of eighteen, mental competency, and being diagnosed with a
terminal illness in which you have six months to live.142 In addition, the
patient must make an oral request, wait a minimum of fifteen days, make a
second oral request, and then make a written request; in some states you must
wait another forty-eight hours after the second request.143 If the procedural
requirements are met, the doctor may prescribe end-of-life medication that
must be taken by the individual and without assistance from the doctor.144
B. BUT WHAT ABOUT AID IN DYING IN PRISONS?
Despite growing success at the state level in securing access to aid in
dying, individuals incarcerated in states with pro-aid in dying laws are barred
from access, and individuals incarcerated in states without pro-aid in dying
laws are prevented from moving to favorable states given their incarcerated
status.145
While aid in dying is available in states that permit it, the same
compassion is not extended to prisoners with terminal illnesses. Prisoners
over the age of fifty represent the fastest growing prison population.146 The
aging and terminally ill prison population poses unique health care
challenges such as chronic illness, heart disease, and diabetes that prisons are
in May 2017, a House representative introduced H.B. 160, An Act to Amend Title 16 of the
Delaware Code Relating to End of Life Options; in January 2018, a Utah State Representative
introduced H.B. 210, Utah End of Life Options Act, a House representative from Indiana
introduced H.B. 1157, End of Life Options; in February 2018, the Arizona House and Senate
introduced two bills that would legalize aid in dying (2018 AZ H.B. 2611, 2018 AZ S.B.
1414). As of April 2018, twenty-five states were considering passing aid in dying legislation.




142 See State-by-State Guide to States With Physician-Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG,
https://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132#Washington (last
updated on Feb. 21, 2017) [http://perma.cc/FB3W-UUU9]; see also How to Access and Use
Death with Dignity Law, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.
org/learn/access/#Eligibility [http://perma.cc/NP7T-WM7P] (last visited Nov. 8., 2017).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See infra Part III.B. and Part IV.
146 Sari Horwitz, The Painful Price of Aging in Prison, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/05/02/the-painful-price-of-aging-in-
prison/?utm_term=.4ffdcb077191 [http://perma.cc/F7DE-JFES].
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ill-equipped to manage.147 Incarcerated individuals age faster than their non-
incarcerated counterparts. Research has shown that a prisoners’
physiological age averaged ten to fifteen years older than their chronological
age.148 Furthermore, medical care is woefully inadequate for the aging and
terminally ill prison population.149 Imagine then the following scenario:
A prisoner starts to feel ill and notices that he has lost some weight. He goes to the
prison’s infirmary and medical personnel tell him that he is faking his pain and that
there is nothing wrong with him. The prisoner goes back to his cell and as weeks pass,
his pain becomes excruciating to the point where he returns back to the infirmary.
When he is finally seen by a medical official, he is diagnosed with cancer—he is given
six months to live.150 While pain management becomes the logical next step, medical
officials are concerned about the inmate “gaming for drugs,” which creates potential
147 Id.
148 Brie A. Williams, et al., Aging in Correctional Custody: Setting a Policy Agenda for
Older Prisoner Health Care, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1475, 1477 (2012).
149 See Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, Are You (Still) My Great and Worthy Opponent?
Compassionate Release of Terminally Ill Offenders, 83 UMKC L. REV. 521, 539–43 (2015);
see also Violet Handtke et al., Commentary, The Pains of Imprisonment: Challenging Aspects
of Pain Management in Correctional Settings, PAIN MGMT. (2016) (detailing that inmates
often have difficulty obtaining even over-the-counter pain medication, restricted access to
opioids for pain management, and lack of access to nonmedication treatment options because
of lack of ability to be transported outside of the correctional facility); Brie A. Williams, et
al., Balancing Punishment and Compassion for Seriously Ill Prisoners, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 122, 135 (2011) (as of 2011, only 75 of 1719 state correctional facilities and 6 of 102
federal facilities had hospices); John F. Linder & Frederick J. Meyers, Palliative Care for
Prison Inmates: “Don’t Let Me Die in Prison” 298 JAMA 894, 895 (2007) (timely access to
medical care is sometimes impeded by security concerns). Indeed, there are various court cases
reflecting the move health care treatment the aging and terminally ill patient experiences
behind bars. For example, Walter Jordan, an inmate at the Arizona Department of Corrections,
died of an invasive skin cancer that “ate through his skull and invaded his brain.” David Fathi,
How Poor Health Care Turned Walter Jordan’s Prison Sentence Into a Death Sentence,
ACLU: BLOG (Jan. 11, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-
rights/medical-and-mental-health-care/how-poor-health-care-turned-walter-jordans
[http://perma.cc/QV4P-WDHD]. One expert noted that “Mr. Jordan may well have survived
had he been treated by a competent dermatologist and referred to an oncologist sooner.” Decl.
of Dr. Todd R. Wilcox, at 2 ¶ 26–28, ECF No. 2496, Parsons v. Ryan, 2:12-cv-00601-DKD.
Indeed, “the severe and unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate
provision of medical . . . health care” played a significant role in the Supreme Court’s order
to California state officials to reduce their prison population. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493,
502, 545 (2011).
150 Based on a composite of individuals outlined in Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 149, at
526; Bruce Rushton, Horrific Healthcare: In Illinois Prisons, Getting Sick Can be a Death
Sentence, ILL. TIMES (June 25, 2015, 12:14 AM) http://illinoistimes.com/article-15777-
horrific-health-care.html [http://perma.cc/9TEP-2BG4].
2019] DEATH WITH DIGNITY 657
barriers to his pain management and end-of-life care.151 The denial of pain medication
then leaves the terminally ill prisoner in great pain.152
Though aid in dying is available in seven states and the District of
Columbia, some prison policies within those states explicitly prohibit
prisoners from obtaining aid in dying. For example, in the Washington
Department of Corrections Offender Health Plan manual, it explicitly states
that, “[t]he Department does not provide medication to a patient with a
terminal illness for self-administration to end his or her life.”153 In addition,
California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) adopted
a resolution that prevented California Correctional Health Care Services or
those affiliated from participating in “activities under the end of Life Option
Act” on CDCR premises or those owned by and “[c]onsistent with th[e]
policy, patients shall not be permitted to access aid-in-dying drugs under the
End of Life Option Act.”154 As the pioneering state in aid in dying, Oregon’s
Department of Corrections has a policy that it does not “participate in or
allow other health care providers to participate on its premises in the Death
with Dignity Act.”155 Lastly, in Colorado, one of the states to more recently
pass aid in dying legislation, the Department of Corrections adopted a
regulation prohibiting health care providers “from prescribing medication to
151 Susan J. Loeb et al., End-of-Life Care and Barriers for Female Inmates, 40 J. OBSTET.
GYNECOL. & NEONATAL NURSING. 477, 479 (2011). Prison medical personnel are often
conservative in prescribing pain medication for fear that it will make its way to the general
prison population and be abused. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 149, at 557; Victoria J.
Tann, Prison Hospice Care: Life and Death Behind Bars, 13 AM. J. PSYCH. RES. J. 1, 3 (2018).
152 Id.
153 Washington DOC Health Plan, WASH. DEP’TOFCORR., 600-HA001 at 5 (Jan. 1, 2019),
available at http://www.doc.wa.gov/docs/publications/600-HA001.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VFW7-UCX5]
154 Inmate Medical Services Policies and Procedures Volume 1: Governance and
Administration, Chapter 40; 1.40: End of Life Option Act: EXEMPTION POLICY, CAL.
CORR. HEALTH CARE. SERVS. (Effective June 6, 2016), available at https://cchcs.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/60/2017/08/IMSPP-v01-ch40.pdf. [http://perma.cc/4DPT-JUX2]. The
resolution was subsequently codified as a regulation at 15 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15,
§ 3999.200(e) (2019) (“Patients in the custody of CDCR shall not be provided aid-in-dying
drugs under the End of Life Option Act.”).
155 Authority, Purpose, and Policy, OR. DEP’T OF CORR. (effective Nov. 7, 2017),
available at https://secure.sos.state.or.us/oard/viewSingleRule.action?ruleVrsnRsn=236014
[http://perma.cc/HX3F-6QQN]. See also OR. ADMIN. R. 291-124-0005(3)(e) (2017) (“Death
with Dignity Act: It is the policy of the department not to participate in or allow other health
care providers to participate on its premises in the Death with Dignity Act (ORS
127.800 to 127.897). Consistent with this policy, inmates will not be permitted to access end
of life counseling or drugs under the DWDA[.]”)).
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any offender within a DOC facility to assist him/her with medical aid in
dying.”156
IV. THE EIGHTHAMENDMENTAPPLIED TOAID INDYING
A. CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the infliction of
“cruel and unusual punishment.”157 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the contours and scope of the Amendment’s protection has evolved over
time. In one of the earliest cases, the Court held that “torture” was prohibited
by the Amendment.158 The Court next determined that death by electrocution
did not violate the Eighth Amendment.159 In dicta, however, the Court noted
that “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death[.]”160 While torture and a “lingering death” seemingly fall under the
purview of the Eighth Amendment, the Court later widened the scope of
interpretation where the Amendment not only encompassed barbaric
punishment tactics of the past, but must also apply to contemporary
standards. The Court in Weems v. United States noted, “[t]he clause of the
Constitution . . . may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice.”161 The Court inWeems, then, is largely responsible for
infusing the concept of evolving standards of decency through public
opinion.
The contemporary understanding of the Eighth Amendment was
established by Trop v. Dulles.162 The Trop Court established that the Eighth
“Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”163 Trop is responsible for the
modern-day interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment and, at the very
156 COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., Administrative Regulation No. 700-27: Offender Health
Services: Medical Decisions and Advance Directives (Effective July 1, 2018), available at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RjBNNXZWDurDvXDNcp5j62tSZDbFxyUH/view
[http://perma.cc/RWK4-BE7T].
157 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution was made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962).
158 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879).
159 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 439–43 (1890).
160 Id. at 446–48.
161 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (internal citations omitted).
162 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
163 Id. at 100–01.
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least, is responsible for invoking evolving standards of decency in the
evaluation of certain punishments.164
In interpreting “evolving standards of decency,” the Court must look to
“objective indicia”165 of contemporary public opinion or values166 because
“cruelty” is not “merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral
judgment” that may change with time.167 The Court has found that legislative
enactments,168 jury sentences,169 and international opinions are appropriate
objective indicia of “evolving standards of decency.”170 In addition, the
Court has considered the roles of public opinion polls171 and expert
communities, such as doctors, in its evolving standards of decency
analysis.172 In Hall v. Florida, to determine whether a Florida statute that
prohibited a defendant from offering mitigating evidence of his intellectual
disability because his IQ was 71 instead of the state-sanctioned threshold of
70 was unconstitutional, the Court consulted psychiatric and professional
studies to determine “whether there [was] a consensus . . . .”173 Writing for
the dissent, Justice Alito distinguished traditional interpretations of evolving
standards of decency as encapsulated in the objective indicia of “American
society as a whole,” whereas the Hall majority relied on the “evolving
standards of professional societies.”174 While Hall specifically dealt with
164 See generally Moore v. Texas, 137 S.Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (affirming that the Court
looks to “evolving standards of decency in deciding what constitutes “cruel and unusual
punishments”); Atkins v. Virginia, 546 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of a
“mentally retarded criminal” offends “evolving standards of decency” and therefore violates
the Eighth Amendment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (finding that deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s medical need offends “evolving standards of decency” in violation
of the Eighth Amendment).
165 See Moore, 137 S.Ct. at 1052; Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1996 (2014); Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012); Atkins, 546 U.S. at 312. Note that the “objective indicia”
originated in Coker v. Georgia as “objective evidence.” 433 U.S. 584, 584 (1977).
166 Coker, 433 U.S. at 584; Atkins, 546 U.S. at 311.
167 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
168 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
169 Endmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982).
170 Id.
171 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (“polling data shows a widespread consensus among
Americans . . . .”); see alsoMiller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 510 (2012) (“In [the] search for
objective indicia, the Court toyed with the use of public opinion polls.”).
172 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1993–94 (2014); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316
n.21 (considering the “official positions” of organizations such as the American Psychological
Association); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (The Court in finding that
executing a person less than sixteen years old “would offend civilized standards of decency”
relied on the “views that have been expressed by respected professional organizations.”).
173 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1993.
174 Id. at 2002 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal italics omitted).
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intellectual disability claims, at least one scholar believes that “[c]ountless
other issues can be viewed and litigated through the [medical] consensus
framework if the Court adheres consistently to the principle that evolving
standards of decency govern not only what punishments are constitutionally
prohibited but also the procedures by which those punishments are
imposed.”175
Applying the standards articulated by Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
prohibition on aid in dying in prison is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment,” indicated objectively by
public opinion and the opinion of the medical community.176 Furthermore,
while some would argue that access to aid in dying is an affirmative act and
thus not required under the Eighth Amendment, this Comment argues that
based on Estelle precedent,177 states that permit aid in dying or do not
criminalize it have an affirmative duty to allow prisoners to access the
procedure. States that criminalize aid in dying or are silent on the issue have
an affirmative duty to provide access to the procedure because of the
Constitution’s federalism notion of states as laboratories.
B. ESTELLE’S AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES TO PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE
In states that have legalized aid in dying, denying it to prisoners is a
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual”
punishment.178 However, one potential counterargument is that there is no
Eighth Amendment violation in states that do not allow aid in dying, by either
criminalizing the act directly or indirectly in homicide statutes.179 While
facially, the relationship between the Eighth Amendment and states that do
not allow aid in dying seems nonexistent, closer examination of the Estelle
holding—establishing a right to medical care in prison—as well as
examining the Framers’ intent to have states act as laboratories both lead to
a plausible conclusion that even states that criminalize aid in dying have an
affirmative duty to provide such care in the context of prison.
175 Bidish J. Sarma, How Hall v. Florida Transforms the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Analysis, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 186, 196
(2014).
176 See Part IV, supra.
177 This will be further discussed in Part IV.B.
178 See generally Part V.A–C, supra.
179 As of July 2018, forty-three states considered assisted suicide illegal. States with Legal
Physician-Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG (Last updated July 9, 2018, 7:37 AM),
https://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132#illegal_states
[perma.cc/FB3W-UUU9]. Of those forty-three, thirty-six states have law prohibiting assisted
suicide, three states prohibit assisted suicide by common law, and four states have no specific
laws regarding assisted suicide or are otherwise unclear on the legality of the issue. Id.
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The Court in Estelle reviewed the history and evolution of the Eighth
Amendment’s treatment of conditions, circumstances, or acts that constituted
“cruel and unusual” punishment.180 In dicta, the Court found that the
government has an “obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is
punishing by incarceration.”181 The government has such an affirmative duty
because “[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical
needs; if authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.”182 The Court
then looked at modern legislation and concluded that the legislation espoused
the view that, in the Court’s own words, “it is but just that the public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of
his liberty, care for himself.”183 Therefore, because incarcerated individuals
are unable to freely get the medical attention they need, the State is obligated
to provide it.184 The Supreme Court reiterated this principle in Brown v.
Plata.185 In Plata, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that
prisoners are deprived of rights that are “fundamental to liberty” and though
they are incarcerated, prisoners “retain the essence of human dignity inherent
in all persons.”186
While the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to various affirmative
duties that arise under the duty to provide medical care, there are at least two
instances where this affirmative duty has been interpreted broadly to include
a duty to prevent an inmate’s suicide and a duty to provide access to abortion
while incarcerated. For example, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit have all analyzed suicides and
suicide prevention, or lack thereof, under the affirmative right to medical
care.187 Additionally, while there is currently a circuit split regarding
180 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976).
181 Id. at 103.
182 Id.
183 Id. (internal citation omitted).
184 See generally Jeffrey Natterman & Pamela Rayne, The Prisoner in a Private Hospital
Setting: What Providers Should Know, 19 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 119, 126 (2016) (“A
prisoner, by definition, is not free to seek treatment for serious medical conditions that may
be . . . extremely painful. Allowing a prisoner to suffer with a . . . medical condition that the
prisoner cannot address on his own due to confinement imposed by the state could result in
liability for the state under the Eighth Amendment.” (internal citation omitted)).
185 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
186 Id. at 510.
187 Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 222 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that “‘particular
vulnerability to suicide’ is just one type of ‘serious medical need’”) (internal citation omitted);
Estate of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 553 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Risk of suicide is a serious
medical need.”); Salter for Estate of Salter v. Michell, 711 F. App’x. 530, 537 (11th Cir. 2017)
(“Jail suicides are akin to failure to provide medical care.”); Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231,
1248(10th Cir. 2015) (Prison and jail officials “have a constitutional duty to take reasonable
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abortion in prison, several circuits have analyzed the right to abortion in
prison as an affirmative right to medical care. For example, Monmouth
County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, the Third Circuit
found that nontherapeutic abortions188 constituted a serious medical need,
covered by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.189 Additionally, the Third Circuit found that while the women
were responsible for funding their own abortions, if they were unable to do
so, the county was required to assume the full costs of the procedure.190
Taken together, some circuit courts have found an affirmative duty to prevent
suicide and to facilitate abortion access to incarcerated individuals. The
inclusion of suicide prevention and access to abortion while incarcerated
demonstrates a widening of courts understanding of what constitutes medical
steps to protect the prisoners’ safety and bodily integrity. Claims based on a jail suicide are
considered and treated as claims based on the failure of jail officials to provide medical care
for those in their custody.”) (internal citation and alterations omitted); Williams v. Branker,
462 F. App’x. 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2012) (Prison officials have a duty to “limit the opportunities”
for prisoners to harm themselves); Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010),
vacated sub nom. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011), opinion reinstated in part by
Conn. v. City of Reno, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (mem.) (“A heightened suicide risk or an
attempted suicide risk is a serious medical need” that falls under the purview of the Eighth
Amendment.); Anderson v. Dallas Cty. Texas, 286 F. App’x. 850, 847 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A]
failure to provide adequate protection against a prisoner’s known suicidal impulses is
actionable” under the Eighth Amendment.); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th
Cir. 2001) (“[A] prisoner’s psychological needs may constitute serious medical needs,
especially when they result in suicidal tendencies.”) (internal citation and alteration omitted);
Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[O]nce one is classified as a suicide risk,
the right to be protected from that risk would seem to fall under the ambit of the right to have
medical needs addressed.”).
188 A therapeutic abortion is defined as an “abortion induced when pregnancy constitutes
a threat to the physical or mental health of the mother.” Therapeutic Abortion, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER MED. DICTIONARY (2018), https://www.merriam-webster.com/ medical
/therapeutic%20abortion [perma.cc/X267-3VDJ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018). A
nontherapeutic abortion is also known as an “elective abortion.” See Angelo Benzo Norman,
Comment, Beal v. Doe, Maher v. Roe, and Non-Therapeutic Abortions: The State Does Not
Have to Pay the Bill, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 288, 289 (1977).
189 834 F.2d 326, 345–49 (3d. Cir. 1987). But see Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir.
2008) (holding that “an elective, non-therapeutic abortion does not constitute a serious medical
need, and a prison’s institution’s refusal to provide an inmate with access . . . does not rise to
the level of deliberate indifference to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.”); Victoria
W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004); Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532 (6th Cir.
1991). While the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on this issue, perhaps interestingly, the
same year that Crawford was decided, the Court declined to grant certiorari on an Arizona
case where the State Superior Court assumed that an abortion was a serious medical need and
found that the prison was required to transport the woman to an abortion center. Doe v. Arpaio,
No. CV 2004-009286, 2005 WL 2173988, at *1–2, (Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2005), aff’d,
150 P.3d 1258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1280 (2008) (mem.).
190 834 F.2d 326, 351 (3d. Cir. 1987).
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care. This expanding view of medical care suggests that aid in dying, a form
of end-of-life care, may fall under courts umbrella term of “medical care.”
One issue that has risen post-Estelle is what constitutes “serious medical
need.”191 The Court has never explicitly defined what constitutes “serious
medical need” or “medical care.” In the absence of an explicit Supreme
Court pronouncement, the Court’s dicta in health care cases is instructive.
The Court at least tangentially recognized that terminal illnesses are a
legitimate medical condition, and that the subsequent prescription for a lethal
dose of drugs to end one’s own life may be considered treatment. In
Gonzalez v. Oregon, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of “whether the
Controlled Substances Act allows the United States Attorney General to
prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in aid in dying,
notwithstanding a state law permitting the procedure.”192 In 2001, the U.S.
Attorney General promulgated an Interpretive Rule that declared using
controlled substances to aid suicide is not a legitimate medical practice and
dispending them for the purpose of aid in dying is unlawful under the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA).193 While the Supreme Court found that
the Interpretive Rule was an overreach by the Attorney General and that the
Controlled Substances Act “does not authorize the Attorney General to bar
dispensing controlled substances for assisted suicide,” for our purposes, the
importance of the opinion is the language employed by the Court in coming
to that decision.194 The opinion characterizes the individual seeking aid in
dying as a “patient,”195 the substance used to terminate one’s own life as a
“prescription,”196 the patient received a “diagnosis” from a physician, and
conflates “medical judgment”197 with “medical treatment.”198 From this
language it is plausible that a terminal illness that leads a prisoner to seek aid
in dying would fall under and fit within the “serious medical need”
conceptualized by the Estelle Court.
Further evidence of the Court’s implicit acknowledgment that an
underlying terminal illness is a “serious medical need” and the prescription
used to end one’s own life constitutes medicine or medication can be found
in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Gonzalez v. Oregon.199 In his dissent, Justice
191 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 106 (1976).
192 546 U.S. 243, 248–49 (2006).
193 Id. at 249.
194 Id. at 274–75.
195 Id. at 271.
196 Id. at 251.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 243.
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Scalia argued that intentionally assisting suicide does not constitute medicine
or a “legitimate medical purpose.”200 To support this contention he relies on
a dictionary definition of “medicine,” which defines the word as
“prevent[ing], curi[ng], or alleviate[ng] disease”201 and finds that “virtually
every medical authority . . . confirms that assisting suicide has seldom or
never been viewed as a form of ‘prevention, cure, or alleviation of
disease.’”202 Based on this rationale, Justice Scalia finds that assisting
suicide is “not a legitimate medical purpose.”203 In sum, Justice Scalia
admonishes the majority’s conception of aid in dying and the drugs that
facilitate the intentional taking of one’s own life as medicine or medical
treatment. This suggests that the majority, at least in dicta, conceptualizes
the underlying reason for aid in dying as an illness in need of medical care
and that care arrives in the form of life-endingmedicine. If we are to construe
aid in dying as “medical treatment,” then the prison administration would be
obligated to provide for it as set forth in Estelle.
C. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
1. Public Opinion
Public opinion about aid in dying has dramatically changed in the last
several years. While I do not suggest that public opinion should be a
determinative factor in the constitutionality of a prisoner taking his or her
own life, it reveals how society has come to view an issue that is largely
received in ethical, moral, and religious terms.
A 2013 public opinion analysis conducted by Pew Research Center
found that between 1990 and 2013, support for the notion that “there is a
moral right to suicide when a person . . . [i]s suffering great pain with no hope
of improvement” increased from 55% to 62%.204 Between 2013 and 2015,
support for the view that aid in dying increased from 45% to 56%.205 Perhaps
200 Id. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (quoting WEBSTER’SNEW INTERNATIONALDICTIONARY 1527 (2d ed. 1950)).
202 Id. at 286.
203 Id.
204 Views on End-Of-Life Medical Treatments, PEW RESEARCHCTR. 7 (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2013/11/end-of-life-survey-report-
full-pdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/LC5Q-ECHR].
205 Michael Lipka, California Legalizes Assisted Suicide Amid Growing Support for Such
Laws, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/10/05/california-legalizes-assisted-suicide-amid-growing-support-for-such-laws/
[http://perma.cc/4UCA-P23M]. While this paper is not delving into the topic of support for
aid in dying along demography, it is interesting to note that approval/disapproval of aid in
dying was largely split by race and race in relation to religion. Views on End-of-Life Medical
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more intriguing is the increase in support of those polled who believed that
there is a moral right to suicide when a person is “ready to die because living
has become a burden.”206 While support for this notion is less than a
majority, in 1990 support hovered at 27%, whereas in 2013 support increased
11 percentage points to 38%.207
Much of the argument in favor of aid in dying stems from ideas about
patient autonomy and self-determination.208 The Pew Research Center
suggests a relationship between how those polled conceptualize quality of
life and autonomy. For example, in 2013, 49% of those polled agreed that
“[b]eing able to talk/communicate” was important for a good quality of life
in older age.209 In addition, “[b]eing able to feed oneself,” and “[g]etting
enjoyment out of life” were next in order of what is important for a good
quality of life in older age.210 Interestingly, while much of the conversation
surrounding support for aid in dying emphasizes pain (usually in the context
of terminal illness), “[l]iving without severe, lasting pain” was ranked fourth
in terms of what is important for a good quality of life in older age.211 That
pain was only ranked fourth seems to support the notion that those seeking
aid in dying as an option are not just motivated by pain, but other quality of
life factors. For example, in a 2008 study by the Oregon Public Health
Division, only 5% of individuals in Oregon who died by aid in dying were
concerned with pain or experienced physical pain.212 In addition, in 2009
Oregonians who had requested aid in dying were surveyed on a scale of 1–5,
1 being “not at all important” and 5 being “very important,” about their
reasons for wanting aid in dying. Present physical pain only received a
Treatments, supra note 203, at 22. For example, 53% of white adults approved of laws to
allow aid in dying for terminally ill patients, whereas 32% of Hispanic and 29% of black
individuals polled approved of laws to allow aid in dying for terminally patients. Id. The
skepticism that Hispanic and black folks feel may stem from the risks aid in dying “may pose
to the poor, minorities, and other traditional victims of discrimination” where there are
“inequities in medical care” based on race, gender, age, and class. GAILEY, supra note 29, at
9–10. See also Fenit Nirappil, Right-to-Die Law Faces Skepticism in Nation’s Capital: ‘It’s





207 Id. at 7.
208 See Part III.A., infra, for a discussion on autonomy and medical technology
withdrawal.
209 Views on End-of-Life Medical Treatments, supra note 203, at 26.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, THE LAW OF LIFE ANDDEATH 180 (2011).
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median of 1, anticipation of future pain received a median of 3, and the
highest median-scoring for aid in dying was “wanting to control the
circumstances of their own death, fear of future poor quality of life . . . .”213
More recently, a Gallup Poll measured public opinion on aid in death for
terminally ill patients and approximately 67% of those surveyed believe that
a doctor should assist a terminally ill patient in death.214 The aforementioned
data revealing the rationale behind an individual’s decision to end their life,
as well as public opinion surrounding the morality of suicide and the
emerging support for aid in dying suggests that as a society we are moving
towards allowing compassionate death or rather death with dignity.215
2. Opinion of the Medical Community
Opinions of the medical community on the ethics of aid in dying are far
from uniform. The American College of Physicians, American Medical
Association, and American Nurses Association oppose the legalization of aid
in dying.216 Despite opposition from several national associations, a number
of state medical societies are dropping their opposition to aid in dying.217 In
213 Id. at 180–81.
214 Majority of Americans Remain Supportive of Euthanasia, GALLUP (June 12, 2017),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/211928/majority-americans-remain-supportive-euthanasia.aspx
[perma.cc/LS5T-QY7D].
215 Note that while public opinion is available for aid in dying, such opinion data is not
available in regards to how public opinion fares when the subject of aid in dying is
incarcerated.
216 See e.g., Lois Snyder Sulmasy et al., Ethics and the Legalization of Physician-Assisted
Suicide: An American College of Physicians Position Paper, 167 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
576, 578 (2017); Physician-Assisted Suicide, in Ch. 5 Opinions on Caring for Patients at the
End of Life, AM. MED. ASS’N PRINCIPLES OF MED. ETHICS (2016), available at
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-
5.pdf [http://perma.cc/KE96-F87H]; Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide, and Aid in Dying, AM.
NURSES ASS’N, Apr. 24, 2013, http://www.nursingworld.org/euthanasiaanddying
[http://perma.cc/8ZGW-ZRDS].
217 Laura Crimaldi, Massachusetts Medical Society Ends Opposition to Physician-
Assisted Suicide, Adopts Neutral Stance, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2017,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/12/02/massachusetts-medical-society-decide-
whether-doctors-should-help-dying-end-their-lives/GtVH8TuY1IebcMmltEoy4M/story.html
[http://perma.cc/Y88J-96KY]; Charles Eichacker, Maine Doctors Softening Stance on
Physician-Assisted Suicide, PRESSHERALD, http://www.pressherald.com/2017/04/30/with-an-
aging-population-and-more-states-allowing-it-maine-doctors-warm-to-idea-of-physician-
assisted-suicide [http://perma.cc/NYT7-U3WJ]; Vermont Medical Society Policy on End-of-
Life-Care, VT. MED. SOC., Nov. 4, 2017, http://www.vtmd.org/sites/default/files/2017End-of-
Life-Care.pdf [http://perma.cc/95VE-J9ZU]; Dan Whitcomb, California Medical Association
Drops Opposition to Doctor-Assisted Suicide, REUTERS, May 20, 2015,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-assistedsuicide-california/california-medical-
association-drops-opposition-to-doctor-assisted-suicide-idUSKBN0O52TI20150520?irpc=
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addition, healthcare providers themselves are also changing their stances. In
2014, Medscape, an online information resource for clinicians and the
general public, conducted a survey of over 17,000 U.S. physicians about a
series of contentious issues.218 When asked whether aid in dying should be
allowed, 54% said yes, 31% said no, and 15% said “it depends.”219 The
percent who said yes increased by 10% since the survey was last issued in
2010.220 More recently in 2016, when physicians were asked about whether
aid in dying should be allowed for terminally ill patients, 57% said yes.221
There are several possible explanations for physician opposition to or
skepticism about aid in dying. The first is that some in the medical
community believe that participation in aid in dying violates the Hippocratic
Oath.222 The Hippocratic Oath is taken by medical students and provides the
moral and ethical foundation for medicinal practice.223 “Do no harm” is
believed to be derived from the Hippocratic Oath and is offered as a
justification for a physician to reject participation in both death penalty
932 [http://perma.cc/M2GG-T87L]. As of March 2018, ten state chapters of the AMA have
dropped their opposition to aid in dying. SeeMichael Ollove, Aid-in-Dying Gains Momentum
as Erstwhile Opponents Change Their Minds, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/03/09/aid-in-dying-
gains-momentum-as-erstwhile-opponents-change-their-minds [http://perma.cc/X728-ETAJ].





221 Shelly Reese, Ethics Report 2016: Life, Death and Pain, MEDSCAPE, Dec. 23, 2016,
https://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/ethics2016-part2 [http://perma.cc/E77E-
9DVE]. In 2018, the percent of physicians who believed aid in dying should be allowed for
terminally ill patients experienced a modest increase to 58%. See Keith L. Martin, Ethics
Report 2018: Life, Death, and Pain, MEDSCAPE, Dec. 12, 2018,
https://www.medscape.com/slideshow/2018-ethics-report-life-death-6011014#2
[http://perma.cc/KX74-DYB8].
222 See, e.g., Paul McHugh, Editorial, Dr. Death Makes a Comeback, WALL ST. J., Jan.
22, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/paul-mchugh-dr-death-makes-a-comeback-
1421970736 [http://perma.cc/24MB-AWNP] (noting that historically doctors have refused to
aid a patient in taking their own life because it is contrary to the Hippocratic Oath); Lawrence
R. Huntoon, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: The Destruction of Morals, Ethics,
and Medicine, 21 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 98, 100 (2016) (aid in dying laws violate
the Oath of Hippocrates); Dennis M. Sullivan & Robert M. Taylor, The Ethical Landscape of
Assisted Suicide: A Balanced Analysis, 34 ETHICS &MED.: AN INTERNAT’L J. BIOETHICS 49,
50–51 (2018).
223 Hippocratic Oath, ENCYCL. BRITANNICA (last updated Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hippocratic-oath [http://perma.cc/NEB5-TRP7].
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executions and aid in dying.224 However, despite popular belief, “do no
harm” is never actually mentioned in the Hippocratic Oath.225 Further, even
if adherents follow “do no harm,” there are many ways to conceptualize
“harm.” For example, some proponents of aid in dying suggest that
“[n]eedless suffering is more painful for patients . . . [and] allowing
prolonged suffering is doing more harm than” aid in dying.226 Indeed one
doctor suggested that contemporary understandings of “harm” have shifted,
which at least in part explains the shift in physician support: “[w]e’re having
a paradigm shift about what’s viewed as harmful . . . [p]eople are getting
used to the idea that death is sometimes the least worst alternative. It can be
deliverance.”227
While the National Medical Association has yet to support aid in dying,
evidence of state associations and doctor support over the past several years
suggest a trend towards acceptance of aid in dying as an option for terminally
ill individuals. Indeed, the Court in Hall was receptive of considering
“trends” as a component of an objective indicia analysis for evaluating
evolving standards of decency as part of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment.228
3. But What About Tyranny of the Majority?229
One obvious concern with relying, even in part, on public opinion and
the medical community is that it offends the very point of having a
Constitution,230 namely to tamper the passions of the majority.231 This innate
224 See Tony Yang & Farr A. Curlin, Why Physicians Should Oppose Assisted-Suicide,
315 JAMA 223, 247–48 (2016).
225 Daniel K. Sokol, “First Do No Harm” Revisited: following the Dictum Means
Balancing Moral Principles, 347 BMJ 23 (2013).
226 Alicia Ault, Doctor Support for Assisted Death Rises, But Debate Continues,
MEDSCAPE (July 7, 2017), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/882334 [http://perma.cc/
5887-B9KT].
227 Robert Lowes, Physicians Support for Assisted Death Continues to Grow, J. MED.,
(Jan. 1, 2017).
228 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1998 (2014).
229 THEFEDERALISTNO. 51 (Hamilton or Madison) (“It is of great importance in a republic
not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the
society against the injustice of the other part . . . . If a majority be united by a common interest,
the rights of the minority will be insecure.”).
230 See generallyMartin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The
Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE. L.J. 449 (1991).
231 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very
purpose of a Bill of rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”).
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distrust of majoritarian rule empowered the Anti-Federalists to demand a list
of rights that the government could not take away; the list became the first
ten amendments to the Constitution.232 Professor Mary Sigler argues that the
Court’s “reliance on objective measures of contemporary values stacks the
deck in favor of majoritarian outcomes and is thus at odds with the nature
and significance of a constitutional right.”233 Indeed it seems that the kind of
majoritarian analysis that the Court undertakes in evaluating “evolving
standards of decency” is equivalent to the “fox guarding the hen house;” it is
difficult to imagine a group more despised and in need of protection than
criminal offenders. Thus the fear and reality of the “evolving standards of
decency” usurping the protective function of the Eighth Amendment is valid.
However, there are three points that weaken this argument.
The first is that while the Court considers the pulse of the public in
determining “evolving standards of decency,” the analysis does not end there.
While “objective evidence” is important, it does not “wholly determine the
controversy” because “the Constitution contemplates that in the end [the
Court’s] own judgment will be brought to bear.”234 In other words, the
“objective indicia” are necessary, but are not sufficient in deciding whether
a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. The second argument is that while the danger of the
majority’s harmful imposition on the minority is fair, in the context of aid in
dying, the prisoner is choosing to utilize aid in dying as opposed to it being
forced upon him. Of course, the concept of “choice” in prison has been well-
written about and raises issues about the general autonomy and “choice” of
an incarcerated individual.235 Lastly, while the current standard may be
interpreted as bending towards the tyranny of the majority, there is an
argument to be made that the standard in actuality exists as a kind of
“political morality.” That is to say, the “evolving standards of decency”
analysis “should reflect the kind of people we are—or aspire to be—and the
232 Ugonna Eze, The Anti-Federalists and Their Important Role During the Ratification
Fight, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Sept. 27, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/
blog/the-anti-federalists-and-their-important-role-during-the-ratification-fight/
[http://perma.cc/4T64-4RBJ].
233 Mary Sigler, The Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
403, 405 (2011).
234 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
597 (1977)).
235 Ann Neumann, The Limits of Autonomy: Force-Feedings in Catholic Hospitals and in
Prisons, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 305 (2013–2014) (arguing that the practice of force feeding
limits an inmate’s autonomy); see generally Jukka Varelius, The Value of Autonomy in
Medical Ethics, 9 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 377, 377, 379 (2006) (noting the potential
diminished autonomy of prisoners).
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treatment of offenders that entails, calling offenders to account without
displaying the vice of cruelty characteristic of the offenses themselves.”236
In other words, in the context of aid in dying, we shall not deny unto others
what we would not deny unto ourselves. The unavailability of aid in dying
for inmates who are gravely suffering offends the most basic standards of
evolving decency in light of the emerging consensus on the accessibility and
availability of aid in dying.
Few would disagree that terminal prison patients face a myriad of
complications such as pain, nausea, and a host of other physical issues.237
Indeed, while palliative care and pain management are often encouraged for
elderly and terminal prisoners, a study conducted of cancer care in prison
showed that there were “obstacles to effective cancer pain management” due
to “institutional barriers . . . [i]nclud[ing] restricted availability of opioids,”
“reluctance of physicians to prescribe opioids,” and under-treatment of the
elderly.238 The treatment of terminally ill prisoners and the subsequent denial
of aid in dying fits within the “cruel and unusual” punishment jurisprudence.
That is to say, terminally ill prisoners are essentially being left to die and
often times, in pain. The inevitability and wasting away that terminally ill
prisoners face fits within the Kemmler Court’s conception of “lingering.”
Further, despite the fact that aid in dying statutes were specifically designed
to alleviate pain and facilitate a death with dignity, the same is not true for
prison inmates. Therefore, terminally ill inmates must suffer through the
remaining days they have left. The availability of aid in dying for non-
incarcerated individuals and the prohibition on access for incarcerated
individuals seems to fit within the conceptualization of a “lingering” death
that constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.” That is, by denying
terminally ill patients in prison the opportunity to die with dignity, the State
is exercising unnecessary punishment on a group of vulnerable, ill, and
hurting individuals that would offend our notions of human dignity.
V. STATES AS LABORATORIES: WHYAID INDYING SHOULD BEAVAILABLE
TOALL PRISONERS
Underlying the Court’s rationale in both Estelle and Plata are notions
about states as laboratories. Justice Louis Brandeis spoke of what is now an
236 Sigler, supra note 232, at 407.
237 See Brie A. Williams et al., Pain Behind Bars: The Epidemiology of Pain in Older Jail
Inmates in a County Jail, 17 J. PALLIATIVEMED. 1336 (2014). See generally Guy Maytal &
Theodore A. Stern, The Desire for Death in the Setting of Terminal Illness: A Case Discussion,
8 PRIM. CARECOMPAN. J. CLIN. PSYCHIAT. 299 (2006).
238 James T. Lin & Paul Mathew, Cancer Pain Management in Prisoners: A Survey of
Primary Care Practitioners and Inmates, 29 J. PAIN&SYMPTOMMGMT. 466, 466–67 (2005).
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oft quoted celebration of federalism. He believed that the role of the states
was to perform a “laboratory” function:
To say experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial
of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.239
Justice Brandeis celebrated a federal system that enables states to serve
as laboratories because that system allows states to implement policies that
are “more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society.”240
Viewed from this perspective, “states are . . . encouraged to try out new
approaches to dealing with social, and even moral, problems.”241 Indeed in
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court’s landmark case on the subject of aid
in dying, Justice Souter in his concurring opinion notes that the Court did not
find that aid in dying was unconstitutional, but rather left the decision to the
discretion of the individual states to decide whether they wanted to
experiment with legalizing aid in dying.242 Justice Souter recognized that it
is “highly desirable” to have state legislatures experiment with aid in dying243
and he expected, quite prophetically, that experimentation would be
“attempted in some of the States.”244 In a 2011 Supreme Court decision the
Court acknowledged that states as laboratories permits “innovation and
experimentation and enabled greater citizen involvement in democratic
processes and makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry.”245
Tied to the notion of states as laboratories, is the idea of a mobile
citizenry. The concept of federalism presupposes diversity of
implementation of varying ideas “coupled with mobility.”246 Underlying the
states-as-laboratories argument, whereby the Court recognizes arenas of
239 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
240 Id.
241 Brian H. Bix, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Federalism, 17 NOTREDAME J.L. ETHICS
&PUB. POL’Y 53, 55 (2003).
242 521 U.S. 702, 787 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); see also id. at 737 (1997)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that States are evaluating aid in dying, which is a “liberty
interest[] . . . entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States . . . in the first instance.”) (citing
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
243 Id. at 789.
244 Id. at 788.
245 Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011).
246 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1504 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN
(1987)).
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social policy best left to the discretion of states for the purposes of
experimentation, is that this idea requires a mobile citizenry. By allowing
states to experiment with various social policies, the idea is that “given the
plurality of jurisdictions and the possibility of mobility among them, persons
can move out from under oppressive policies,” including a jurisdiction’s
approach to morality, moral regulation, and other policy domains.247 Though
the concept of mobility as a fundamental right is beyond the scope of this
Comment, it is important nonetheless to note that the Supreme Court has
recognized mobility as a fundamental right that facilitates and necessitates
federalism notions of “states as laboratories.”248
Thus applying the Court’s rationale in Esetelle, Pata, Bond, and
Liebmann, by incarcerating an individual, you deny him the ability to freely
move to states that align with his values. Because incarceration status strips
the individual’s right to move freely and to live in certain jurisdictions that
are amenable to his views of morality, healthcare, and more, then the prison
has an obligation to provide for the individual what he cannot provide for
himself. For aid in dying in the context of prison, this rationale applies as
follow: if the incarcerated individual were free, he could move to a state that
allows aid in dying and would be permitted to obtain the procedure.
However, by virtue of his incarceration, he is unable to move freely and thus
unable to procure a course of treatment available elsewhere that a non-
incarcerated individual could readily obtain. Combining this logic
established by Justice Brandeis concerning “states as laboratories,” with the
Court’s rationale in Bond, explaining the relationship between a mobile
citizenry and federalism, and the logic established in Estelle explaining why
the prison system has a duty to provide healthcare with the logic in
Estelle/Pata, a prison consequently has an affirmative duty to provide such
medical care for him.
247 Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 459, 460 (2007).
248 SeeGregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“This federalist structure preserves
to the people numerous advantages. It assures decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in
government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition
for a mobile citizenry.”); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–30 (1969) (“This
Court . . . recognized that the nature of our Federal Union . . . require that all citizens be free
to travel throughout . . . our land.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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CONCLUSION
Opinions about aid in dying have evolved in recent years and the public
has become more accepting of the underlying rationale for permitting it. The
autonomy, self-determination, and pain that a terminally ill patient may feel
justifies the decision to die with dignity. Not only has the public become
more receptive, but courts and state legislatures have as well. Despite an
overall trend towards compassion in aid in dying, terminally ill incarcerated
individuals are not afforded the same compassion, nor the same opportunities
to end-of-life care. This is a violation of the Constitution’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment because it is unnecessarily punitive and
exacerbates the pain of individuals already suffering. When the state strips
individuals of their freedom and denies them their ability to “provide for their
own needs,” the government has an affirmative duty to provide for the
inmate.249 Regardless of howwemorally feel about aid in dying as an option,
and perhaps believe that those incarcerated deserve to suffer, the state must
fulfill its obligation to provide for aid in dying because anything less is
“incompatible with the concept of human dignity . . . .”250
249 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011).
250 Id. at 510–11.
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